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NOTES
Extraterritorial Effect of Foreign Decrees and Seizures
The recent and lengthy New York decision, Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bank of New York and Trust Co.," again brings to the fore the tremendous
confusion existing in our courts regarding the operation of the decrees of
a foreign government upon private civil rights.
Prior to the advent of the Third Reich, the Soviet Confiscatory Decrees
of i918 were responsible for the most vexing problems in this field. How-
ever, in the last few years, cases involving the effect to be given to the
German monetary and anti-racial decrees have raised new and troublesome
questions.
Both the Russian and German decrees have caused the courts in many
instances to abandon well-established conflict of laws precepts in favor of
public policy, a most uncertain guide. Historically, the activities of the
Confederacy during the Civil War 2 and the various expropriation
measures of the different Mexican governments 3 are responsible for a cer-
tain amount of precedent, but these cases are for the most part limited to
the question of giving effect in the forum to the acts of a sovereign operat-
ing upon tangible property located within its own physical* jurisdiction.
The object of this Note is to discuss the principles laid down in the
leading cases dealing with the effect to be given by our courts to foreign
decrees, classifying the cases according to whether the property to be
operated upon by the decree is tangible or intangible, and whether or not
it is regarded by the court as located within the territory of the confiscating
government. 4 It is interesting to note that most of the cases to be discussed
have arisen in New York, and in the light of this fact the great amount of
confusion existing in this field of law is even more sursprising.
I. THE SOVIET DECREES
In 1917 the Kerensky or Provisional Government was overthrown by
the Soviet Regime. The nationalization of insurance, banking, shipping,
and other forms of business shortly ensued. The operation of these decrees
upon corporations, whether organized under Russian law and doing branch
businesses in other countries,5 or whether domiciled in other countries and
I. 28o N. Y. 286, 2o N. E. (2d) 758 (I939), Note 49 YALE L. J. 324, 88 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 116.
2. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176 (1877). See i MOORE INT. LAW DiG. (i9o6)
56.
3. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U. S. 304 (i918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (i918); Monte Blanco Real Estate Corp. v. Wolvin Line,
147 La. 563, 85 So. 242 (I92O); Molina v. Comision Reguladora, 92 N. J. L. 38, 104
Ati. 450 (i918) ; O'Neill v. Central Leather Co., 87 N. J. L. 552, 94 Atl. 789 (1915) ;
Mitchell v. Banco de Londres y Mexico, 192 App. Div. 720, 183 N. Y. Supp. 446 (1st
Dep't 1920); Bartlesville Zinc Co. v. Compania Minera, 202 S. W. 1048 (Tex. Civ.
App. i918); De La 0 v. Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Ref. Co., 202 S. W.
1027 (Tex. Civ. App. i918). Cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S.
347 (199) ; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 (z897); Canadian Southern R. R.
v. Gebhard, io9 U. S. 527 (883). For recent decisions see Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.
(2d) 673 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Stark v. Howe Sound Co., 254 App. Div. 9,9, 5 N. Y.
S. (2d) 551 (3d Dep't 1938).
4. The situs of intangibles seems to be an open question.
5. Wohl, Nationalization of Banking Corporations in Russia (927) 75 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 385.
(983)
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doing business in Russia raised difficult problems, and multiple anomalous
situations arose.
In the first place, the apparently well-established concept of a corpo-
ration has been challenged. According to the dogma, if a corporation no
longer exists in the state of its charter, a fortiorari it no longer exists in a
foreign state where it is doing a branch business.6 After the passage of the
decrees it became necessary to determine their effect upon certain corporate
attributes. Did the Russian corporations doing business in this country
retain the right to continue in business as corporations; could they sue as
corporations for the purpose of enforcing their contracts; or could they be
sued as corporations for the purpose of protecting obligations owing to our
own citizens? For many purposes public policy has demanded that the
existence of these Russian corporations be preserved, even at the expense
of overthrowing old concepts.
Secondly, it was necessary to determine whether the Soviet Govern-
ment by virtue of its confiscatory laws had acquired any claim to the prop-
erty of Russian corporations where such property lay outside the physical
jurisdiction of the Russian State. This question presented no difficulty at
all prior to the recognition of the Soviet Government by our State Depart-
ment. Not much help was to be found in the decisions of other countries
which had already recognized Russia. There, varying results had been
reached, and the principles applied were vague.7 According to precedent,
recognition gives retroactive validity to all the acts and decrees of the
newly-recognized government from the date of its de facto existence.,
Apparently the Soviet Government thereby gained rights in the United
States. These rights would probably never have been asserted had not the
United States at the time of the recognition obtained an assignment of the
claims of the Soviets in this country.'
a. Where Situs of Property is Within Confiscating Country
It is a well-established principle that the courts of one sovereign will
recognize the acts of another sovereign acting upon property within the
territory of the latter.10 This of course assumes that the government issu-
ing the decrees is a de facto government as distinguished from a band of
outlaws. However, it need not be recognized as a de facto government by
the state department of the forum. It need only be acknowledged as such.
This rule is based upon public policy rather than upon conflict of laws prin-
ciples, although where the decree operates upon tangible property, strict
conflict of laws principles are not violated."
6. 2 BFALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 744. Cf. Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v.
National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 17o N. E. 479 (193o).
7. Wohl, supra note 5.
8. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918). Cf. Wrightv. Nutt, [17881
3 Br. C. C. 326, 126 Eng. Reprint 83. In Aksionairnoye Obschestvo. v. Sagor, [1921]
I K. B. 456, the Soviet Government confiscated lumber located in Russia and owned
by a Russian national. It was subsequently shipped into England where it was sold to
the defendant. The plaintiff contended that the decrees should not be given extraterri-
torial effect, and as the Soviet Government was unrecognized at the time, the court
decided that it was not bound to give effect to the decrees. However, when the case
came up on appeal, [1921] 3 K B. 532, the Soviet Government had been extended
recognition, and the court reversed the decision.
9. 28 Am. J. Int. L. (Supp. 1934), Official Documents No. I, pp. i-ii. The
United States was to apply any moneys collected under the assignment to the claims of
Americans deprived of property as a result of the decrees.
io. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 (1897). But the de facto government
must continue to maintain its status as such. Cf. King of Two Sicilies v. Wilcox,
[1851] 61 Eng. Reprint 116.
ii. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
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In Salintoff v. Standard Oil Co.,1 2 a quantity of oil was confiscated by
the Soviet Government within its own territory from one of its own
citizens. At this time the Soviet Regime was unrecognized both de jure
and de facto by the United States, although its existence as a de facto gov-
ernment, supreme within its own territory, was acknowledged. The Stand-
ard Oil Company purchased the oil in Russia and subsequently brought it
to the United States where the former owner brought suit in New York
courts. Judgment was awarded to the defendant on the ground that the
Soviet Government had the power to acquire title to the oil, and that as an
existing de facto government, the court would not look behind its acts.
This result is just. As Russia was unrecognized at the time, it would
not have been embarrassing to the State Department to have found for the
plaintiff. However, the Standard Oil Company had given value for the
oil, and as between the two innocent parties, public policy in the United
States would seem to favor our own nationals. The decision harmonizes
with the strict conflict of laws rule that if an act does not constitute a wrong
in the place where it was done, it will not be regarded as a wrong by the
court of the forum even though the same act if occurring in the place of the
forum would there be actionable.1 8
Of course where the confiscating government is recognized, the public
policy against looking behind its decrees affecting property located within
its borders is even stronger. Whether to disregard them would be consid-
ered a judicial encroachment of the treaty-making powers of the executive
department is not entirely obvious, but at least such an action would be
embarrassing to the State Department. In terms of public policy, recogni-
tion of a foreign government by our State Department seems to create a
superior form of public policy, completely absorbing any local policy con-
flicting with it.
However, where the confiscating government is unrecognized, this
superior form of public policy apparently does not exist, and it would there-
fore seem to be desirable in some situations for the courts of the forum to
refuse to give effect to the decree. Take for instance, the hypothetical case
where the property of an American corporation located in Russia has been
seized as a result of the decrees. Subsequently the Soviet Government sells
this property to another American firm. According to precedent, our courts
would not challenge the right of the purchasing corporation to the prop-
erty.14 On the basis of public policy this is a weaker case for recognizing
the effect of a decree than the situation in which the former owner of the
property was not a United States citizen.
Suppose, however, that the Soviet Government undertook to ship the
confiscated property to the United States for the purpose of selling it here,
and before sale its former owner attached it and brought suit for its recov-
ery? Although public policy is controlling in a situation of this kind, prece-
dent would seem to indicate that the Soviet Government would.prevail,
even though unrecognized.
Where the property confiscated is intangible, the same type of reason-
ing can be used once the situs of the obligation is determined. In Dougherty
v. Equitable Life Assurance Co.,15 an American corporation had been doing
a branch business in Russia. As a result of the decrees the property of
this branch business was confiscated and all its obligations annulled. The
12. 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (I933).
13. 2 BF.ALE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1298.
14. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304 (1918).
15. 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (934).
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plaintiffs here were policy-holders of the corporation whose claims had been
destroyed by the decrees. Consequently they came to this country for the
purpose of bringing suit against the corporation at its domicile. The con-
tracts were drawn up in Russia and were to be performed there. Further-
more, by the terms of the policy, all disputes arising thereunder were to be
settled in the Russian courts and according to Russian law. A statutory
form known as the "Pravila" required that this last stipulation be a part of
every such policy.
The New York Court of Appeals decided that the plaintiffs could not
recover, chiefly on the ground that they had contracted to be bound by
Russian law, and by Russian law the obligation no longer existed. Further-
more, the situs of the debt, according to the court was in Russia, and the
rule that one government will not look behind the decrees of another affect-
ing property within its own territory, became operative. The court also
emphasized the fact that recognition of the Soviet Government by our State
Department was an important element of the decision.
In a concurring opinion by Judge Lehman, the rationale of the major-
ity of the court was questioned. Entirely disregarding the fact that the
parties had contracted to be bound by Russian law, Judge Lehman
approached the problem realistically. He contended that as the obligation
was intangible property, its situs could, for the purpose of nullifying the
effect of the decrees, be regarded as in the United States. He arrived at
this conclusion by relying on a term of the policy that the assets of the
company wherever located should constitute a guarantee of the fulfillment
of its Russian obligations.
This decision could logically have been decided either way. The court
might have found that the plaintiffs had contracted to be bound by the laws
of Imperial Russia, not by the laws of whatever government existed in
Russia at the time the obligation matured. Furthermore, the court might
have found that the situs of the obligation was in the United States, although
the argument that it was in Russia is a little more convincing.
In construing the effect of recognition, the opinion concluded that our
courts need not give effect to the laws of a recognized government intended
to operate extraterritorially if they are against local public policy. Recog-
nition only required our courts to give effect to decrees applying to prop-
erty within the dominion of Russia.
As a matter of justice, whether the opinion was rightly decided or not
depends upon whether the insurance company was a loser as a result of the
confiscatory decrees. Although the Soviet Government confiscated all the
Russian assets of the Equitable, it also relieved the company of all its obliga-
tions. Whether the obligations so released exceeded the assets seized does
not appear. Obviously it would be unjust to allow the defendant to make
a profit out of the operation of the decrees. However, to allow the present
plaintiffs to recover would open the doors of our courts to all the Russian
creditors of the corporation. The fact that the plaintiffs here were with but
one exception expatriated Russian nationals was emphasized by the court.
However, on a strictly conceptual basis it would not seem to make any dif-
ference whether the policy-holders were Russians or citizens of the United
States.16
16. Although Prof. Nussbaum, in Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Con-
flict of Laws (1940) 49 YALE L. J. O27, asserts that the nationality of the plaintiffs
and the fact that the Equitable was an American corporation are "contacts" to be con-
sidered in deciding whether public policy shall be invoked. The term "contact" is the
rough equivalent of situs as used in this note. Id. at 1038, 1039.
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Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co.,'7 decided by the New York Court
of Appeals before the United States had recognized Soviet Russia, was
very similar on its facts to the Dougherty case. Here a Russian refugee
brought suit in New York on an insurance contract made through the
defendant's Russian branch. In order to determine whether a New York
statute staying such an action was valid under the Contract Clause of the
Federal Constitution, the court was required to decide whether or not the
contract in question was an American or Russian obligation.
The contract itself was practically identical with the one in issue in the
Dougherty case. The contract was made in Russia, and apparently was to
be performed there. As in the Dougherty decision, the stipulations in the
policy complied with the "Pravila". The obligation of the contract was
guaranteed not only by the funds deposited in Russia, but also by all the
property belonging to the company, wherever located.
The court found that the situs of the obligation was in the United
States, (a) because the defendant was a New York company and its con-
tractual obligations were based upon New York law, and (b) because the
contract expressly stipulated that the obligation was to be guaranteed by all
the assets of the company, thereby implying that the contract might be per-
formable elsewhere than in Russia.
Obviously this decision conflicts with the Dougherty case in rationale.
In each case the result shapes the reasoning. In the one instance, for the
purpose of preventing an American corporation from warding off the law-
suit of foreigners, the court decides that the situs of the obligation is in the
United States in the other case, for the purpose of defeating the claims of
foreign policy-holders, Russia was considered the situs of the obligation.
Recognition of Soviet Russia may account for the change in the attitude of
the court.
Sokoloff v. National City Bank 18 also involved a determination of the
situs of intangible property. The plaintiff and the defendant bank, an Amer-
ican corporation, made a contract in New York whereby the defendant was
to establish a credit in its Petrograd branch for the plaintiff. Subsequently
the Soviet decrees confiscated the defendant's Russian branch, and in this
action the plaintiff sought to recover the balance of his account. The court
held that the defense of confiscation of the assets and release of the liabilities
of the Russian branch would not defeat the plaintiff's recovery. The situs
of the obligation was in the United States, and therefore the decrees of
unrecognized Soviet Russia could not effect a release.
The fact that here the contract was made in New York, although per-
formance was to be in Russia, distinguishes this case from the two decisions
previously discussed. However, in determining the situs of an obligation
the place of performance is the factor of paramount importance.' 9
If there had been any evidence that the funds had been segregated by
the Russian branch for the use of the plaintiff, the case would probably
have gone the other way. In such a situation the money would have been
in the form of tangible property (res of a trust), and there would have
been no doubt that the Soviet Government had dominion over it. However,
there was no showing that the obligation had been earmarked, nor that the
defendant had any more money in Russia after the making of the contract
than before. The court probably felt that the defendant had lost nothing
17. 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749 (1927).
i8. 239 N. Y. 158, i45 N. E. 917 (1924).
i9. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897
(1934).
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in this particular transaction, and therefore for the purpose of defeating the
decrees, public policy dictated that the United States be considered the situs
of the obligation.
b. Where Situs of Property is in the United States
Although it was universally conceded that the Soviet decrees operated
to confiscate tangible property located within Russia, it was just as
emphatically denied that they gave the Soviet Government claim to prop-
erty located in other countries, at least as long as it remained unrecognized
by the country in which the property was situated.
20
One of the first problems to come before the courts was to determine
whether the American branches of the dissolved corporations retained such
existence in this country as to make them subject to suit. It was clear, as
a matter of public policy, that these Russian corporations should not be
allowed to deny their corporate existence for the purpose of defeating the
claims of American creditors.
In Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co.,21 an English com-
pany had assigned its rights against the defendant to an American corpora-
tion. The assignee brought suit in the New York courts, seeking satisfac-
tion out of the assets of the American branch of the Russian corporation.
The court, in holding that the defendant was not immune from suit,
remarked that a corporation having the vitality to plead is not dead, and
concluded that public policy was not in favor of immunity in this situation.
22
Moreover, the court suggested that the result would be the same even if
the Soviet Government were recognized.
Furthermore, courts soon sanctioned the right of the American
branches of these defunct corporations to sue in the corporate name, disre-
garding competent proof that their existence had been terminated by the
Soviet decrees.3
Instead of adhering to pre-existent concepts of corporate law, courts
have viewed the situation realistically, contending that in effect, and for
many purposes, these corporations were no different from domestic corpo-
rations. Their business in this country was quite generally segregated from
the European business. At any rate, public policy favored keeping them
alive.
2 4
20. Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369
(1925) ; Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama Oil & Chemical Factory v. National City Bank,
21o App. Div. 665, 206 N. Y. Supp. 476 (924).
21. 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925).
22. See also Issaia v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 55 Misc. 495, 499, 23o N. Y. Supp. 735,
739 (Sup. Ct. 1935). ". . . pre-Soviet corporations in the absence of special cir-
cumstances are juristic persons in contemplation of law and may sue and be sued in the
courts of this State in a proper action." For a comparative study of the question, see
Wohl, The Nationalization of Joint Stock Banking Corporations in Soviet Russia and
its Bearing on. Their Legal Status Abroad (927) 75 U. oF PA. L. REv. 385; cf. Note
(1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 816.
23. Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 17o N. E. 479
(930). Here the plaintiffs, a Russian corporation, had been dissolved in Russia and a
quorum of the directors fled to Paris where they were attempting to wind up the for-
eign business of the corporation. The court, recognizing the right of the corporation
to sue in our courts, stated that "The personality created by law may continue unim-
paired until law rather than might shall declare it at an end". Cardozo points out that
under our law there is nothing in the concept of a corporation that would prevent this
action, and the defendant has been unable to show that the concept of corporation as
known to the law of Russia is any different. Accord, Vladikavkazsky R. R. v. New
York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934).
24. The English cases allow the existence of these corporations to continue on the
theory that the Soviet Government did not intend the decrees to operate on them.
First Russian Ins. Co. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., [1928] Ch. D. 922; Banque
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Most of the troublesome litigation has arisen over the final disposition
of assets. Although the Russian corporations were allowed to remain in
business in this country for years after they had been dissolved by the
Soviet decrees, they were gradually liquidated by state authorities. In many
instances large surpluses remained after domestic creditors and lienholders
had been satisfied. Under ordinary circumstances such a surplus would be
transmitted to the domiciliary liquidator for the purpose of satisfying the
claims of foreign creditors and distributing the remainder among the share-
holders. 25  However, in the Russian situation there was no machinery of
this type at the domicile, and the problem of disposing of these funds became
a bothersome one even while the Soviet Government remained unrecog-
nized. The directors of the defunct corporations were constantly in our
courts seeking possession of the surpluses for the purpose of distributing
them among foreign creditors and shareholders.
Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard2 1 the earliest leading case on this
question, decided that the directors could not recover, but that the Com-
missioner of Insurance should be allowed to retain the assets indefinitely,
until such a time as the United States might recognize Soviet Russia. The
decision was based upon two factors: (a) as the authority of the directors
to continue to represent the corporation was uncertain under Russian law,
to give them possession of the funds would expose the defendant to the risk
of being sued in one of the countries recognizing the Soviet Government,
and (b) the fact that the United States might subsequently recognize Soviet
Russia would possibly affect the rights of the parties.
In Matter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.),27 a later case involv-
ing the same question, the New York Court of Appeals came to a different
conclusion, believing that the retention of the fund until the recognition of
Soviet Russia by the United States would work an injustice upon foreign
creditors. Consequently, it was held that where the directors constituted
a quorum and held powers of attorney from the majority of stockholders,
the court should no longer concern itself with the distribution of the fund.28
However, if the corporation is no longer represented by a quorum of
the board, courts regard whatever remaining directors there are as con-
servators of the surplus. The fund is turned over to them on the condition
that they file a surety bond to ensure application of the assets to the use of
the corporation.
29
c. The Effect of Recognition
Difficult as it was to apply well-established juridical concepts to the
problems created by the Soviet decrees prior to recognition, even more
anomalous situations arose after the State Department extended recognition
in 1933. According to the dogma, recognition operates retroactively, legal-
Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow, [1925] App. Cas. 150; Rus-
sian Commercail & Industrial Bank v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1925] App.
Cas. 112.
25. Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. I59
(1926).
26. 24o N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925).
27. 255 N. Y. 415, 175 N. E. 114 (1931).
28. Accord, Matter of People (Second Russian Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 436, 175 N.
E. 121 (1931) ; Matter of People (Northern Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 433, 175 N. E. 12o
(1931); Matter of People (First Russian Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 428, 175 N. E. 118
(1931). Cf. Severnoe Securities Corp. v. L. & L. Ins. Co., 255 N. Y. 12o, 74 N. E. 299
(I93I).
29. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 28o N. Y. 286, 2o
N. E. (2d) 758 (1939).
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izing every act of the government since its de facto existence.30 The United
States, as assignee of the Soviet Government, claimed that the retroactive
effect of recognition was to validate the confiscatory decrees and conse-
quently to give title to all the property of the Russian corporations in this
country to the Soviet Government. It now became important to determine
whether the Soviet Government, at the time of the passage of the decrees,
intended that they were to operate upon the property of its nationals located
outside of Russia. If the decrees were not intended to have extraterritorial
force, obviously the United States, as assignee, had no claim. On the other
hand, if extraterritorial effect was intended, the United States might have
a case.
In United States v. Belmont,3 a Russian corporation had deposited
certain funds with the defendant bank in New York. The United States, as
assignee of the Soviet Government, brought suit in the federal courts to
recover the sum deposited. The United States Supreme Court, reversing
two lower courts, held that the plaintiff could recover, asserting that even
if the decision was contrary to the public policy of New York, the interna-
tional compact here involved would still prevail. Citing cases in which the
property in question was within the territory of the confiscating govern-
ment at the time of the decree, and therefore not applicable to the instant
situation, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no public policy in
the United States against the recognition of the Soviet decrees. Mr. Justice
Stone, concurring in result but not in rationale, contended that if public
policy in New York were opposed to the enforcement of the decrees, the
public policy of New York would govern this case.
The Belmont case does not award the fund to the United States. It
decides merely that the United States has a claim. The court asserted that
the decision is not binding against possible adverse claimants who may
later intervene. Even so, in deciding that the United States has a claim,
the Belmont case gives extraterritorial effect to the Soviet decrees.
The New York Court of Appeals, in deciding United States v. Man-
hattan Co.,3 2 a case involving the disposition of a fund held by the Man-
hattan Company as custodian for the court, considered itself bound by the
doctrine of the Belmont case. The Northern Insurance Company, a
Russian corporation doing a branch business in New York, had been liqui-
dated by the Superintendent of Insurance. All the claims of domestic
creditors and policy-holders had been satisfied. As the surviving directors
were unwilling to undertake the distribution of the surplus, the defendant
was made custodian of the fund, pending a court proceeding for its distribu-
tion among foreign claimants. The United States, as assignee of the
Soviet Government, made a motion to intervene in these proceedings. The
motion was denied, and subsequently this action in equity was brought. The
court, following the Belmont case, decided that the United States had an
interest in the fund, but left open the question whether that interest was
superior to the claims of foreign creditors for determination on subsequent
trial.
In the recent case of Moscow Fire Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York
and Trust Co.,s3 very similar on its facts to the Manhattan Company case,
the whole question of the effect of recognition upon the disposition of these
funds was re-examined by the New York Court of Appeals. Judge Lehman,
30. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 25o (1897).
31. 301 U. S. 324 (937).
32. 276 N. Y. 396, 12 N. E. (2d) 518 (1938).
33. 280 N. Y. 286, 2o N. E. (2d) 758 (1939).
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voicing the opinion of the majority, came to the conclusion that the Soviet
decrees did not apply to the business or property of the plaintiff located in
New York because the plaintiff must be treated for this purpose as a sepa-
rate organization, subject exclusively to the laws of New York. In view of
this fact, the decrees could not have been intended to operate in the United
States upon insurance companies such as the plaintiff. He pointed out
that it was not necessary to decide whether the decrees were intended to
apply to other types of Russian business having a situs in New York, or
whether, if so intended, they would be given such effect. The court seems
to regard the insurance business as unique, and so completely within the
control of the state that the confiscatory decrees could not possibly have
any effect upon the ownership of property here, even if so intended.
Conceding that if the United States had invoked the judicial authority
of New York to aid in giving force to the Soviet decrees, state laws and
public policy would then have to be subordinated to the will of the United
States, the court argues that here the United States invoked the aid of the
court only to enforce the rights of the Soviet Government assigned to the
United States, whatever those rights might be. Thus the New York courts
were given carte blanche to determine what rights the United States had
acquired. According to this reasoning, the court, in deciding that the
United States had acquired nothing by the assignment, thought that the
decision could not be embarrassing to the State Department. Thus in the
absence of recommendations by the United States, recognition apparently
has no greater consequences than to require that state courts give effect to
decrees intended to operate extraterritorially only when the decrees do not
violate local public policy.
The majority opinion in the Moscow case stated that the Belmont deci-
sion had no application here for the reason that it was admitted by demurrer
in that case that the Soviet Government had acquired title to the fund.
Consequently, the New York court disregarded principles laid down in the
Belmont case which are obviously inconsistent with the result reached in
the instant decision.
Judge Rippey and two others dissented, chiefly on the ground that
while local public policy would determine the extraterritorial operation of
the decrees, there is actually no public policy in New York against their
enforcement. Applying the doctrine of the Belmont case, the dissenting
opinion inconsistently reasserted the statement that "no state policy can
prevail against the international compact here involved". Having deter-
mined that the Soviet decrees must be given effect in the- United States if
such was the intent of their authors, the dissenting judges decided that such
was the effect intended.
Although the distinction was not brought out by the court, the Moscow
case could have been reconciled with the Belmont case on the basis that in
the latter decision the Russian corporation had never done business within
the State of New York but had merely deposited money in a New York
bank. Consequently, the same measure of control over the property could
not be exercised by the State of New York. In the Moscow case the ele-
ment of control was strongly emphasized, and the fact that insurance is a
business peculiarly within the control of the State was decisive.
However, to base these cases upon the degree of control exercised by
the state of the forum is a novel concept and will certainly lead to further
confusion. According to all existing precedent, it is the degree of control
exercised by the confiscating government at the time of the passage of the
decree that determines whether or not the court of the forum will look
behind the decree. The dogma is that the confiscating government has
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dominion only over property situated within its territorial borders. This
line of demarkation is much sharper than the line drawn in the Moscow
case.
Boiling down the mass of principles and distinctions dealt with in the
Moscow decision, the case seems to stand for the proposition that local
public policy is controlling,34 and that the recognition of Soviet Russia by
the United States does not necessarily mean the consequent generation of a
national public policy, a public policy approving of confiscation and reshap-
ing local policy to its own mould.
II. THE GERMAN DECREES
Essentially, the problems created by the Nazi anti-racial and monetary
decrees are similar to those arising under the Soviet decrees. Of course
one significant difference is that the German Government has been recog-
nized throughout by the United States. In spite of this, however, strong
public policy has been created in this country against giving extraterritorial
effect to the Nazi decrees, thus overriding the logical extension of the
Belmont doctrine into this field.
In 1933 a German decree directed that all Germans owing moneys to
foreign creditors would be released from their obligations by paying the
amount due to the German Conversion Office for Foreign Debts. Many of
the obligations thereby destroyed were to be performed outside of Germany.
Therefore, as the situs of the obligation is not within Germany, to give
extraterritorial effect to the decrees would controvert all authority prior to
the Belmont case.
In Deutsch v. Gutehoffnungshutte, 5 the New York Supreme Court
decided that the fact that German law prevented the defendants from mak-
ing payments into a sinking fund set up in New York, was no excuse for
the defendant's failure to meet its bond obligations. Here the contract had
been made and was to be performed in New York. Other cases involving
the same question have reached a similar result.36 Where performance is
to be rendered outside of Gerniany, the original obligation still exists,
despite the decrees and the doctrine of the Belmont case. Local public
policy is governing.
The same problem has come up as a result of the racial decrees. In
the recent. case of Stern v. Steiner,17 the plaintiffs, doing business in
Czechoslovakia as copartners, had sold and delivered a quantity of hops to
a New York firm. Subsequently, the German Government confiscated the
business of the plaintiffs, and the latter brought this action to collect their
New York claim. The question to be decided was whether the German
decree operated to confiscate the plaintiffs' business wherever located. On
the testimony of a German lawyer who certified that Germany had acquired
34. This was expressly denied in the opinion. Id. at 314, 2o N. E. (2d) at 769.
35. 168 Misc. 872, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 319 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
36. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft,
15 F. Supp. 927 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); Barnes v. United States Steel Works Corp., ii
N. Y. S. (2d) 161 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Finn v. Brown, 169 Misc. 436, 7 N. Y. S. (2d)
115 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Glynn v. United States Steel Works Corp., i6o Misc. 405, 289
N. Y. Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935). In Lann v. United States Steel Works Corp., 166
Misc. 465, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 951 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the defendant set up the decrees as an
excuse for non-performance on bonds payable in Holland. The court referred to the
internal law of Holland, under which non-performance owing to the German decrees
was no excuse. Although reference to the Holland law of conflict of laws would have
resulted in reference to the German internal law, the renvoi doctrine was rejected by
the court.
37. 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 44 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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no extraterritorial rights by the seizure, the court allowed the plaintiffs to
recover.
By finding that the decrees were not intended to have extraterritorial
effect, the court circumvented the Belmont case. Whether or not the
decrees would be given effect if the German Government had intended that
they have extraterritorial force, was not discussed.
A similar set of facts was presented in Johnson v. Briggs.8 Here the
plaintiff's assignors had been doing business in Austria. As a result of the
anti-racial decrees, this business had been seized and turned over to "Kom-
misars". Its accounts in the United States had been assigned to the
plaintiff.
The court, while intimating that the decrees might have been given
effect had the acquisition of Austria been recognized by our State Depart-
ment, decided that in the absence of evidence of such recognition, the case
would be decided upon the basis of local public policy which was
emphatically opposed to such seizures. On this rationale the decision is
entirely consistent with United States v. Belmont.
In Holzer v. Deutsche,39 the Appellate Division carried the public
policy argument to an extreme. The defendant was a German corporation
doing business in Europe, Asia and America. The plaintiff, a German
Jew, was employed by the defendant as general executive manager of the
whole system. The employment contract was for three years at a stipu-
lated sum per annum plus a bonus. It was also provided in the contract
that if the plaintiff should become unable to perform, without fault on his
part, the defendants were to pay him a flat sum in discharge of their obli-
gation under the hiring. The performance of the defendant with regard to
salary was to be in Berlin. On the plaintiff's side, performance was to be
only partially in Germany. Thus there was an argument that the situs of
a part of the obligation was not in Germany.
However, in finding for the plaintiff, the Appellate Division pro-
ceeded on the theory that even though the situs of the contract were in
Germany, if German law is contrary to local public policy the forum is at
liberty to disregard it.
The Court of Appeals 40 reversed the Appellate Division on the first
cause of action wherein the plaintiff was seeking damages for breach of the
employment contract. The court reasoned that as the contract was made
and was to be performed in Germany, German law was supreme. How-
ever, recovery was allowed under the second cause of action which was
based on the contractual stipulation granting a flat sum to the plaintiff if
he were unable, without fault on his part, to serve. The court decided that
as the decree did not apply to the second cause of action, here the plaintiff
had a case.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the cases discussed that local public policy is the
paramount factor in their solution. The Moscow case is now before the
United States Supreme Court, and it will be interesting to observe how it
fares there. A reversal will possibly provide authority for the extraterri-
torial enforcement of German and Mexican confiscatory decrees.
On the public policy issue, there are strong arguments either way in the
Moscow situation. On the one side there is the fact of recognition, com-
bined with an assignment whereby United States creditors of the Soviet are
38. 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 6o (Munic. Ct. 1939).
39. 159 Misc. 83o, 29o N. Y. Supp. i81 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
40. 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. (2d) 798 (1938).
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to be satisfied as against the claims of foreign creditors; on the other side
is local public policy, opposed to giving effect to the decrees for this pur-
pose, with an eye, perhaps, to the new problems created by the German and
Mexican confiscatory measures.
In any event, no matter what is the final disposition of the Moscow
case, it is likely that public policy in the United States will defeat the extra-
territorial force of the Nazi decrees wherever possible. The strong public
policy against the spirit of the Soviet decrees has been mitigated over the
long period of years since their promulgation. The Nazi decrees present an
entirely different situation.
I. K. G.
Remedies of Junior Lienors Omitted from Prior Foreclosure
The solution to the problem of the protection of the rights of a junior
incumbrancer, omitted from a proceeding foreclosing a prior lien, involves
a very technical adjustment of the positions of the various interests so that
the burden of the "debacle of default" will not weigh too heavily upon any
one party. In the early stages of the problem, courts flew in the face of
logical consistency and evolved an extremely practical rule. When a per-
son instituted a proceeding to foreclose his lien, but failed to make a junior
incumbrancer a party, the courts held that, as between the mortgagor and
the senior mortgagee, there was a completely valid foreclosure and sale.'
This they did without prejudice to the rights of the junior lienor.2  How-
ever, as the exact form of these rights was quite nebulous, the courts were
in the advantageous position of being able to work an equitable result in a
particular case without straining the bonds of a rigid formula. It is the
purpose of this Note to ascertain the present-day treatment of the omitted
junior lienor and to see whether rules have been crystallized into definite
form.
When a senior mortgagee forecloses his lien it is desirable that all
subordinate interests be destroyed so that a purchaser will be presented
with a title relatively free from defects." Since the junior interests in the
land are to be cut short, and since they have access only to the proceeds
over and above the amount of the prior lien, it is also desirable that these
lienors be, in some way, notified of the prospective sale so that they can
appear and bid up the property to an amount sufficient for the protection
of their interests. The early method of achieving these objectives was to
make the junior incumbrancers parties to the suit to foreclose the prior
mortgage.
At this stage two different courses were presented to the chancellors
by which they could protect an omitted lienor. They might have held that
where the junior mortgagee was not made a party, the foreclosure was
completely invalid. 4 Such a course, it was thought, would seriously impair
I. Carpentier v. Brenham, 4o Cal. 22I (870) ; Hayward v. Steams, 39 Cal. 58
(870) ; Weed v. Biebe, 23 Vt. 495 (849). See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.
1939) 614; 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1781.
2. 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES (Lacy's ed. 1889) 211. Inasmuch as differences in re-
sult do not appear to depend upon the character of the junior lien, hereafter such termi-
nology as "junior lien", "junior mortgage", etc., will be used indiscriminately. In all
cases it represents any kind of interest which is subordinate to that of the prior lien.
3. WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) § 74; 2 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (5th ed.
1939) § 829.
4. Where a mortgage is foreclosed by exercise of a power of sale and there is a
failure to provide the notice required in the power, this method is used to protect the
NOTES
the foreclosure process and tend to discourage competitive bidding at
sales.5 On this reasoning they took the other course and stated that there
had been a valid foreclosure, but that the purchaser took subject to the
junior incumbrance. If such a holding were to result in the elevation of
the junior mortgage to the position of a first lien on the land the junior
mortgagee would be presented with a windfall through the mere fact of
omission, and this, the courts felt, was too great a penalty to be placed upon
the senior mortgagee or bona fide purchaser for failure to locate all of the
subordinate liens. Therefore the doctrine of equitable subrogation was
invoked, and it was stated that the purchaser stood in the position of an
assignee for the full amount of the prior lien, regardless of the price paid
at the sale.6 Where the senior mortgagee bought in, the normal merger of
the equity of redemption in the legal title was withheld until the subordinate
interest was removed.
7
The inconveniences of legal strife which accompanied the failure to
locate junior liens and effectively make their holders parties to the fore-
closure suit led to the development of new procedures wherein it was not
necessary to resort to the courts and where, therefore, there could be no
requirement of joinder of junior incumbrancers. s To counter-balance the
effect of these new modes, legislation was leveled at them designed to
achieve the old objectives without imposing so serious a burden upon the
party foreclosing.9 Thus emerged foreclosure by advertisement with the
usual requirement of publication of notice of the foreclosure sale plus actual
service of such notice upon the party in possession of the property.Y0 How-
ever, since none of these newer methods require the presence of the junior
lienor in order to extinguish his interest in the land, they are without the
scope of the present consideration.
JUNIOR INCUMBRANCER AS A "NECESSARY PARTY"
It is commonly stated that junior lienors are necessary parties to an
action foreclosing a prior mortgage, or that the plaintiff in the foreclosure
junior interests. Hart v. Estelle, 34 S. W. (2d) 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ; cf. Gandy v.
Cameron State Bank, 2 S. W. (2d) 971 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). But where the fore-
closure is by action, the sale cannot be set aside. White v. Watts, I8 Iowa 74 (1864);
Street v. Beale and Hyatt, i6 Iowa 68 (1864) ; Harris v. Hooper, 5o Md. 537 (1878).
5. See Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform
Mortgage Act (1925) 23 MIcH. L. Rtv. 825, 828. That such is the necessary result is,
of course, open to question. It is possible that the alternative of validating the sale has
an equally deterrent effect. See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 614.
6. Collins v. Riggs, 14 Wall. 491 (U. S. 1871) ; Benedict v. Gilman and Couch, 4
Paige 58 .(N. Y. 1833); 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 236; 5 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 574.
7. Carpentier v. Brenham, 4o Cal. 221 (i87o) ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137,
254 Pac. 339 (1927) ; Levin v. Gates, 71 Misc. 234, 128 N. Y. Supp. 746 (Sup. Ct. I9li).
8. The device which achieved the greatest popularity was foreclosure by exercise
of a power of sale. In the absence of specific provisions to that effect within the
power, and without statutory requirements, a person exercising a power of sale is not
required to notify subsequent lienors. See Scott v. Paisley, 271 U. S. 632, 635 (1926) ;
cf. Chilton v. Brooks, 71 Md. 445, 18 Atl. 868 (i889). Another method is foreclosure
at law by scire facias. The latter is the usual procedure in Pennsylvania, while it is
an alternative in a few other states. Here too, it is unnecessary to notify holders of
subordinate interests. See Matteson v. Thomas, 44 Ill. III, 114 (1866) ; State Bank
of Illinois v. Wilson, 9 Ill. 57, 67 (1847).
9. See 3 MICH. CoMp. LAws (1929) § 14427; 2 N. D. ComP. LAws (1913) § 8079.
For a compact summary of the different procedures see HANDBOOK, NATIONAL CoN-
FERENCE OF COM tSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1925) 615.
10. 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9604. See also Report, Commissioners on a
Uniform Mortgage Law, HANDBOOK, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1922) 264 et seq.
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must join all persons who have interests in the property subject to the
mortgage, so as to cut off or extinguish their rights to redeem the property
from the lien of the mortgage.11 However, an examination of the decisions
reveals that for some purposes the junior lienor is a necessary party while
for others he is not.
A "necessary party" is one who is so vitally interested in the matter
in dispute that a valid judgment or decree cannot be rendered without his
presence. 12 Where the issue is between the mortgagor and the senior mort-
gagee after the foreclosure sale, courts adhere to the common-law rule and
say that the junior incumbrancer was but a "proper" party and that there-
fore the decree is valid." However, where it appears in the pleadings' 4 or
at trial " that there is a junior mortgagee who is not a party, the courts will
usually refuse to proceed until he is brought in, for it would be manifestly
unjust to all of the parties interested to have the sale made subject to an
outstanding right to redeem which inevitably prejudices the sale. Upon
the same line of thought, it would seem that where such an omission appears
after the decree, but before sale, the decree should be opened to include the
junior lienor." Thus, where his presence is discovered before sale he
becomes a necessary party.
Where, after the sale, the purchaser asks to be relieved of his bid and
that the proceedings be opened to include the omitted junior incumbrancer,
different results are reached depending upon the particular rule respecting
the title which is, or should be, tendered at a foreclosure sale.17  In those
jurisdictions which allow the purchaser to avoid his bid, it is obvious that
there the junior incumbrancer must be a necessary party.
Where the issue directly involves the rights of the omitted junior lien-
ors, the language used by the courts has been very confusing as to the
necessity of making such an incumbrancer a party in order to curtail
future action on his part. Troubled with the fear that their language
might be so construed as to invalidate the decree and sale as between the
mortgagor and the senior mortgagee, yet desirous of assisting the junior
lienor, they usually state that a subsequent mortgagee is a necessary, but
not indispensible, party to a suit to foreclose a prior lien.,, But they qualify
their language by adding that if the junior incumbrancer is not made a party
or brought into the suit by proper service of summons, and he makes no
appearance, his rights are not disturbed by a foreclosure and sale. Some
11. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1531; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934)
282; 3 WILTSIEK MORTGAGE FoREcLosuRE (5th ed. 1939) § I100.
12. Pierson v. Pierson, 128 S. W. (2d) io8 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
13. Spokane Savings and Loan Society v. Lillopoulas, 16o Wash. 71, 294 Pac. 561
(1930) ; see Compton v. Jessup, 58 Fed. 263, 312 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895).
14. Gould v. Wheeler, 28 N. J. Eq. 541 (1877) ; see Morris v. Wheeler, 45 N. Y.
708, 711 (1871) ; Norfolk B. & L. Ass'n v. Stern, 113 N. J. Eq. 385, 387, 167. Atl. 32,
33 (1933). In England the practice is the same. Adams v. Paynter, i Col. C. C. 530
(I844). But see 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 273, n. I6.
15. See Hess v. Feldkamp, 2 Disney 332 (Ohio 1858) ; cf. David v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 197 N. C. 617, I5o S. E. 120 (1929). But see Brown v. Nevitt, 27 Miss.
8Ol, 814 (1854). In Ontario there is a practice whereby the Master adds subsequent
liens of record after the bill is filed. HUNTER, FoR~cLosuRE OF MORTGAGES (1899) 46.
16. Hibben, Hollweg & Co. v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 9o Ind. App. 683,
169 N. E. 693 (193o) ; see WASH. STAT. (1939) § 278.09.
17. Empire City Saving Bank v. Sillick, 98 App. Div. i3g, 9o N. Y. Supp. 561 (Ist
Dep't 19o4) ; see WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 307 et seq.
18. Osage Oil & Refining Co. v. Mulber Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 306 (i93o) ; Black v.
Manhattan Trust Co., 213 Fed. 692 (D. Ore. 1914) ; Street v. Beale and Hyatt, 16
Iowa 68 (1864).
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courts, however, state dogmatically that a junior lienor is a necessary party
to a foreclosure suit,19 while others, equally dogmatic, say that he is not.20
The difficulty lies in the inelasticity of meaning attributed to the word "nec-
essary". 2' However, in all cases the results are substantially the same; if
the junior mortgagee is omitted he will ordinarily retain, or acquire, a power
to affect the legal relations of the parties. In the remaining section of this
Note an attempt will be made to define this power.
(a) Effect of Knowledge on the Part of the Senior Lienor
Apparently the early decisions held that it was immaterial whether the
senior mortgagee or the purchaser knew of the existence of the subsequent
lien; if the junior lienor were omitted his rights could not be prejudiced. 22
However, with the development of recording systems, the emphasis shifted.
In accordance with the policy of such acts, where the purchaser is not held
to constructive notice because of a failure to record the junior lien and
where he does not have actual knowledge, the holder of a junior incum-
brance is bound by the foreclosure to the same extent as he would had he
been made a party.23  An affirmative obligation is thus imposed upon the
subsequent party to record his lien or to lose it. It remains to be seen to
what extent his rights can be modified where he has complied with the
statutory mandate.
(b) Effect of Knowledge on the Part of the Junior Lienor
In view of the object of making the junior lienor a party, it is strange
that the decisions seem to place little emphasis upon a junior lienor's lack
of knowledge. It would seem that if the purchaser were to prove that the
junior incumbrancer actually knew of the foreclosure proceedings and did
nothing to intervene or bid at the sale, that would be enough to bar any
claim which he might assert. However, the courts have stated the rule
otherwise, saying that the mere fact of notice would not, of itself, bar his
rights.24 Nevertheless, in spite of a formalistic adherence to rule when the
purpose of the rule is absent, it will be seen that, in fact, notice may have a
very real effect upon the remedies which may be allowed to such a subse-
quent incumbrancer and therefore, perhaps, may have a direct effect upon
those rights which are theoretically unimpaired.
ig. Mechanics State Bank v. Kramer Service, 184 Miss. 895, i86 So. 644 (i939);
see Thomas v. Barnes, 219 Ala. 652, 655, 123 So. i8, 20 (1929) ; Dickinson v. Duck-
worth, 74 Ark. 138, 143 (1905). See also New York Civ. Prac. Act, § 1079 (6).
2o. Harris v. Hooper, 5o Md. 537 (878); accord, Rowan v. Mercer, 1o Humph.
359 (Tenn. 1849) ; see Spokane Saving & Loan Soc., 16o Wash. 71, 74, 294 Pac. 561,
562 (1930).
21. 1 WLTsIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOsuRE (5th ed. 1939) §§ 329, 370; cf. 3 JONEs,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1780.
22. Haines v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. 459 (N. Y. 1818) ; see CAMPBELL, CASES ON
MORTGAGES (2d ed. 1939) 273, n. I.
23. Sibell v. Weeks, 65 N. J. Eq. 714, 55 Atl. 244 (i9o3) ; Kipp v. Brandt, 49
How. Pr. 358 (N. Y. 1875) ; Gamble v. Martin, 151 S. W. 327 (Tex. Civ. App. i912) ;
Rogers v. Houston, go Tex. 403, 6o S. W. 87o (i9oi) ; cf. Memphis & L. R. R. R. v.
State, 37 Ark. 632 (1881). But where there is actual knowledge of an unrecorded lien
the junior lienor retains his rights. Walker v. Schreiber, 47 Iowa 529 (1877) ; Hop-
pin v. Doty, 22 Wis. 621 (i868). Since the problem of the assignment of junior inter-
ests, their recordability, and the consequences thereof, covers a field of its own, it will
not be treated in this Note.
24. Cram v. Cotrell, 48 Neb. 646, 67 N. W. 452 (1896) ; Atwater v. West, 28 N. J.
Eq. 361 (1877) ; Chilver v. Weston, 27 N. J. Eq. 435 (1876). But see Kenyon v.
Shreck, 52 Ill. 382, 386 (1869).
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REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO AN OMITTED JUNIOR INCUMBRANCER
(a) Right to foreclose
Ordinarily, before foreclosure of the senior mortgage, the holder of a
junior mortgage has the right to foreclose even where the lien of the senior
mortgage is in excess of the value of the land, and this he may do without
showing a payment or tender of the amount of the prior lien.2 5 It is a
right which is inherent in the junior lien and is, in effect, a right to any
surplus which arises at a sale to which the junior lienor is a party. Where
the junior lienor has no notice of the foreclosure of a prior lien this right
should still exist unless there are strong equities for its exclusion, for to
deprive the junior incumbrancer of such a right would impair the obliga-
tions of his contract and deprive him of property without due process of
law.28 Where, however, the junior mortgagee knows of the prior pro-
ceeding and has had an opportunity to participate in the sale and so pro-
tect his rights, there is good cause for refusing to allow him to burden
unduly an innocent purchaser with the inconvenience of a second proceed-
ing. Where, even though he has not been notified of the previous sale, it
appears that there is little chance of an excess being produced by a second
sale, again there may be grounds for refusing to allow him to exercise his
right. Such a basis should be strictly limited, however, for the junior mort-
gagee may desire to bid up the property to an amount which will cover his
lien and he should not be prevented from taking such a course if he so
desires, for that was a right which he possessed before the prior foreclosure.
Few courts have adopted such reasoning because, for the most part,
the decisions tend to become tangled in the complexities of the theories of
title and thus overlook the real basis of the junior lienor's rights. However,
some have found the true solution and declared that the right to a judicial
sale is one of the incidents of a mortgage and that this incident can be
secured to the mortgagee only by a sale to which he is a party.27 A proper
limitation is imposed upon this right where the junior incumbrancer knew
of the previous proceeding and did nothing, for there it can be said that he
"waived" his right to appear and bid up the property to create a surplus. 28
Other courts say that, while ordinarily a junior mortgagee has an
unqualified right to foreclosure of his lien, nevertheless no useful purpose
25. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1531.
26. It is this ground which is most frequently employed by the courts in upholding
the rights of junior lienors. Newcomb v. Dewey, 27 Iowa 381 (1869) ; Denton v.
Ontario Nat. Bank, 15o N. Y. 126, 44 N. E. 781 (1896) ; Bigelow v. Davol, 62 Hun
245 (N. Y. I89I) ; Peabody v. Roberts, 47 N. Y. Sup. 91 (1866). Accordingly, where
a Kansas statute provided that land once sold under a lien should not again be sold
under an inferior lien, it was held that this statute could constitutionally apply only to
those liens whose holders were made parties to the prior proceeding. Motor Equip-
ment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127, 69 P. (2d) 23 (1937) ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan.
37, 254 Pac. 339 (1927) ; cf. McFall v. Ford, 133 Kan. 593, i P. (2d) 273 (1931).
27. Alexander v. Greenwood, 24 Cal. 505 (x864) ; Catterlin v. Armstrong, 74 Ind.
514 (i88i) ; Anson v. Anson, 2o Iowa 55 (1866) ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters,
146 Kan. 127, 69 P. (2d) 23 (1937) ; Chilver v. Weston, 27 N. H. Eq. 435 (1876) ;
Atwater v., West, 28 N. J. Eq. 361 (1877); Bigelow v. Davol, 62 Hun 245 (N. Y.
1891) ; Peabody v. Roberts, 47 N. Y. Sup. 91 (1866) ; Walsh v. Rutgers Fire Ins. Co.,
23 Abb. Pr. 33 (N. Y. i86I). Contra: Harrison v. Bank of Fordyce, 178 Ark. 76o, 12
S. W. (2d) 400 (1929); Dickinson v. Duckworth, 74 Ark. 138, 85 S. W. 82 (1905).
In Fox v. California Title Ins. Co., 12o Cal. App 264, 7 P. (2d) 722 (1932), it was
intimated that an omitted lienor might subsequently foreclose to the extent of the sur-
plus from the prior sale.
28. Denton v. Ontario County Nat. Bank, i5o N. Y. 126, 44 N. E. 781 (1896)
(reversed because of insufficient proof of knowledge) ; Levin v. Gates, 7, Misc. 234,
128 N. Y. Supp. 746 (Sup. Ct. 1911); cf. Root v. Wheeler, 12 Abb. Pr. 294 (N. Y.
i861).
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would be served by allowing it to him in this situation, for the priority of
the senior mortgage has been determined in the previous foreclosure; that,
therefore, a right of redemption gives him all of the rights which he would
have possessed at the sale. 29 In so holding the courts overlook the reason
for notifying the junior incumbrancer of the sale, i. e., so that he can appear
and bid up the property. By requiring him to redeem they are forcing him
to a capital outlay which he might not otherwise have had to make. In
such a situation the rights of the omitted lienor are substantially impaired.
It is sometimes said that the junior mortgagee's security rested upon
the equity of redemption; that, where there was a prior foreclosure and sale,
the equity was extinguished, leaving nothing upon which the junior mort-
gage could be foreclosed.30 Such reasoning can be answered in two differ-
ent ways. If there were a necessity for strict legal theory it might be said
that if the legal effect of granting a first mortgage were to place title in the
senior mortgagee, it must follow that, upon the creation of a junior lien,
the equity of redemption would be transferred to the holder of the junior
mortgage leaving the mortgagor a vague interest which might be character-
ized as an equity upon an equity.31 Therefore, when the senior lienor fore-
closed without making the subsequent incumbrancer a party or without
notifying him, such foreclosure could have no effect upon the equity of
redemption. On the other hand, refinements of legal theory could be dis-
carded, and then it would be seen that the junior lienor did not possess all
of the rights which he had before the prior foreclosure.
Differences in result are occasionally explained by recourse to the
"title" and "lien" theories of mortgage law. It is said that an omitted
junior lienor can foreclose in a lien state, but that he cannot in a title state.
The proferred reasons are that whereas, in a lien state, the interests of the
senior and junior incumbrances are of the same nature, in a title state they
are fundamentally different. In the latter type the interest of the junior
lienor covers only that right which the mortgagor had after he granted a
first mortgage, i. e. a right to redeem. Therefore the junior incumbrancer
must be restricted to a redemption from the prior foreclosure sale.32 This
again overlooks the fundamental right in the junior interest to have a judi-
cial sale at which its holder may appear and protect the lien.
In some decisions courts give lip service to the dogma in relation to
the extinguishment of the equity of redemption, forbid the junior lienor to
foreclose, and then accomplish the desired result by allowing him to redeem
by judicial sale. In others, out of a desire to protect the purchaser, the
junior incumbrancer is required to redeem before foreclosing. 4 However,
as has been seen from the foregoing discussion, courts have broken away
from the originally simple rule and involved themselves in intricacies from
29. Wakefield v. Fish, 62 Wash. 564, 116 Pac. 14 (1911).
30. Rose v. Walk, 149 Ill. 6o, 36 N. E. 555 (1894) ; Hamalle v. Kimmel, 224 Ill.
App. 9 (1922) ; cf. Bache v. Purcell, 6 Hun 518 (N. Y. 1876).
31. Goodman v. White, 26 Conn. 320 (857) ; Cheney v. Patton, 134 Ill. 422, 25
N. E. 792 (189o). It is to be noted that this was not the common-law rule. By the
latter a junior mortgagee had merely a lien on the equity of redemption. WALSH,
MORTGAGES (1934) i9O, n. 6. Even under that theory it could be held that the equity
of redemption could not have merged, because it was still subject to an encumbrance.
32. See City of Springfield ex rel. Southern Missouri Trust Co. v. Ransdell, 305
Mo. 43, 51, 264 S. W. 771, 773 (1924).
33. Carpentier v. Brenham, 40 Cal. 221 (87o) ; Froelich v. Swafford, 33 S. D.
142, 144 N. W. 925 (1914).
34. Osage Oil Refining Co. v. Mulber Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 3o6 (C. C. A. ioth,
i93O) ; Foster v. Taylor, 187 Ark. 172, 58 S. W. (2d) 675 (1933) ; Karl v. Connor, 30
Ky. L. Rep. 238, 97 S. W. III, (i9o6) ; cf. Pritchard v. Kalamazoo College, 82 Mich.
587, 47 N. W. 31 (i89o) (bill to foreclose treated as bill to redeem) .
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which they are unable to extricate themselves. No longer can it be said
that, although the foreclosure of the prior lien was completely valid as be-
tween the mortgagor and the senior mortgagee, it had absolutely no effect
upon the junior lienor. Such a result is to be regretted for, in the absence
of countervailing circumstances, it would seem obvious that the omitted
incumbrancer should be entitled to enforce his security.
(b) Right to Redeem
There seems to be little dispute as to the ability of a junior lienor to
redeem from the prior foreclosure sale. Before foreclosure, he had the
right to redeem upon maturity of the senior mortgage, by tendering the
amount of the prior lien, and he should not be deprived of this right without
the benefit of a proceeding to which he was a party or of which he had been
afforded sufficient notice.35 Therefore, where there has been a foreclosure
to which the junior mortgagee has not been made a party, it is usually said
that he retains the equitable right to redeem.36  Nevertheless, since the
right is but a creation of equity, it is circumscribed by equitable limitations.
3 7
Conceding that the junior lienor has a right to redeem, a problem is
immediately presented as to the amount necessary for redemption and the
consequences of the exercise of the right. Conceivably it might be held
that the foreclosure had destroyed the equity of redemption or, more
fashionably, that the lien of the senior incumbrance had merged in the title
acquired from the mortgagor, leaving the property subject to the lien of the
omitted party. Such a rule would be extremely detrimental to the pur-
chaser who bought in at the sale thinking that he was getting a clear title.
It would mean either that he lose a substantial portion of the money which
he has invested or that he be required to add to that amount by paying off
the junior lien. Such a result might be sanctioned as a penalty for failure
to locate the junior incumbrance. Since, however, the courts have not seen
35. Newcomb v. Dewey, 27 Iowa 381 (1869) ; Brainard v. Cooper, io N. Y. 356
(1852) ; accord, Goodman v. White, 26 Conn. 320 (1857).
36. Wiley, Banks & Co. v. Ewing, 47 Ala. 418 (1872) ; Strong v. Allen, 44 Ill. 428
(1867) ; American Buttonhole Co. v. Burlington Mutual Loan Ass'n, 61 Iowa 464
(1883) ; Gage v. Brewster, 31 N. Y. 218 (1864) ; Haines v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. 459
(N. Y. 1818); Farwell & Antis v. Murphy, 2 Wis. 533 (1853); cf. Husebby v. Allison,
25 S. W. (2d) iio8, 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 193o) ; Diddy v. Risser, 55 Iowa 699 (1881).
In McDonald v. Miller, 9o Tex. 309, 39 S. W. 89 (897), a judgment creditor was
denied the right of redemption until he sold on execution, for the reason that he was
said to have an adequate remedy at law. Since he had this remedy he could not exer-
cise the equitable right of redemption. Accord, Gamble v. Martin, 128 S. W. 386 (Tex.
Civ. App. 197o).
37. Kenyon v. Shreck, 52 Ill. 382 (1869). Where the lien of an omitted encum-
brancer covers but a portion of the tract covered by the senior mortgage it is a general
rule that the junior lienor must redeem the whole tract. Quinn Plumbing Co. v. New
Miami Shores Corp., IOO Fla. 413, 129 So. 69o (193o) ; Street v. Beale and Hyatt, 16
Iowa 68 (1864) ; Martin v. Fridley, 23 Minn. 13 (1876). This rule can be justified in
part by the policy protecting bona fide purchasers. But where the purchaser is the
foreclosing party the rule is completely inapplicable. Other courts have favored the
omitted lienor and required him to pay only a part of the senior lien which was pro-
portionate to the part of the property covered by the junior lien. Denton v. Ontario
County Nat. Bank, 15o N. Y. 126, 44 N. E. 781 (1896) (measure set by lower court
unchanged on appeal) ; Green v. Dixon, 9 Wis. 485 (1859) ; cf. Hinners v. Birkevaag,
113 N. J. Eq. 413, 167 At. 209 (1933). A similar problem arises where the redemp-
tioner is a judgment creditor but where a part of the land foreclosed is exempt from a
judgment lien. In that situation the rule is that the creditor cannot redeem the exempt
portion, but that he must pay the full amount of the prior lien. Bank of Luverne v.
Turk, 222 Ala. 549, 133 So. 52 (1933). A different rule was set forth in Sutherland
v. Tyner, 72 Iowa 232, 33 N. W. 645 (887), where, although the creditor was not
allowed to redeem the exempt portion, he was not required to pay the full amount of
the prior lien.
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fit to require the foreclosing party to notify the subsequent lienor of the
sale, an obvious correlative is an attempt to preserve at least a portion of
the amount invested at that sale. This is accomplished by holding that the
purchaser is equitably subrogated into the shoes of the prior mortgagee. 8
Where the senior lienor purchases at the sale the same result is attained by
saying that his lien has not merged with the title procured. Although
merger is said to be a question of intention, nevertheless courts will not
allow it where it would work a hardship. 39 Where the purchase price
amounts to more than the senior lien, such reasoning meets with difficulties
in its application. But, although the factual situation is quite rare, it has
been stated that the courts require the redemptioner to tender the amount
paid at the sale rather than the amount of the prior lien.
40
To require the junior mortgagee to pay more than the amount of the
senior mortgage is to change radically the rights which he possessed before
the foreclosure sale. At that time he might have made his redemption by
tendering the amount of the prior debt. If the policy in favor of the
innocent purchaser emerges triumphant from this situation, it is difficult
to understand why. If the junior mortgage were recorded, as it must be
if its holder is to retain any rights, the purchaser, although actually innocent,
must be held to constructive knowledge of its existence. Thus, it would
seem that the junior lienor should be possessed of the higher equity and, if
such is the case, should not be required to pay more than would have been
necessary before foreclosure.
In their eagnerness to protect the purchaser, the courts also overlooked
possibilities of grave injustice to the mortgagor. Thus, if the senior
incumbrancer bought in for less than the amount of his lien and obtained a
deficiency judgment, he would hold obligations in two capacities-as against
the junior lienor he would be but a mortgagee in possession while, as against
the rest of the world, he would own the property and, in addition, would
hold a personal judgment against his debtor. In order to comply with the
rule, a junior lienor is obliged to tender the amount of the prior mortgage.
Unless some method were devised of satisfying the deficiency judgment, the
senior mortgagee would have been paid in full, yet would hold a claim upon
the mortgagor, contingent ouly upon the latter's ability to pay. The next
step is uncertain but, since as between the mortgagor and the junior lienor
there never was a valid extinguishment of that relationship, it would seem
that the effect of the redemption would be to force at least part of the equity
of redemption back into the mortgagor. Thereafter, by docketing his judg-
ment, the prior lienor could obtain a lien, albeit subsequent to that of the
junior incumbrancer, upon the very land which he foreclosed. Thus, by
the simple procedure of overlooking a junior lienor, the amount which the
38. Osage Oil Refining Co. v. Mulber Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 3o6 (C. C. A. ioth,
i93o) ; Carpentier v. Brenham, 40 Cal. 221 (I87O) ; Martin v. Adams Brick Co., ISo
Ind. 181, o - N. E. 831 (1913); Rogers v. Holyoke, 14 Minn. 220 (I869) ; Cram v.
Cotrill, 48 Neb. 646, 67 N. W. 452 (1896) ; Wetmore v. Roberts, io How. Pr. 51 (N.
Y. 1853) ; Benedict v. Gilman & Couch, 4 Paige 58 (N. Y. 1833) ; Hoppin v. Doty, 22
Wis. 621 (1868) ; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 614.
39. Johnson v. Harmon, i9 Iowa 56 (1865) ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137, 254
Pac. 339 (1927); Walsh v. Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 13 Abb. Pr. 33 (N. Y. 1861); 3
JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 237; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. I939)
§ 1481.
40. The authority of this statement is, indeed, quite slender. In 3 JONES, MORT-
GAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1818, will be found the statement: "If upon foreclosure the prop-
erty sell for more than the amount of the mortgage, the selling price will be the amount
required to redeem." However, upon examination, none of the cases cited will be
found to be on point. Inasmuch as it is the usual practice to bid in mortgaged prop-
erty for the amount of the lien, the exact problem would not be frequently presented.
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mortgagor would have to pay in order to clear his property could be
substantially increased.
The result would be even more absured where a third person bought
in for less than the amount of the prior incumbrance and the senior mort-
gagee obtained a deficiency judgment, for there, upon redemption by the
holder of the subsequent lien, there appears to be scant possibility of evolv-
ing any system whereby the judgment could be satisfied or by which the
purchaser could be compelled to share the proceeds with the senior lienor.
It has been intimated that the senior mortgagee might have some remedy
against the purchaser,41 but neither of these parties could have any interest
in discharging the judgment. If the senior lienor were denied relief from
the purchaser, the latter would acquire a windfall to the extent of the differ-
ence between the sale price and that of the senior lien while the mortgagor
would be penalized by that same amount. In addition, theory would require
the equity of redemption to exist in two different parties at once for, as
between the mortgagor and the junior lienor, the mortgagor would hold
the equity while, as between the junior mortgagee and the purchaser, it
would rest in the latter.
Some courts, apparently realizing that the above rule was inadequate,
have adopted the rule of pro tanto subrogation.4 Where a purchaser buys
in for less than the amount of the prior lien, it is held that he is subrogated
to the rights of the senior incumbrancer only to the extent of the purchase
price. By such a holding the purchaser is prevented from being unduly
enriched while the alternative problem of satisfaction of the deficiency judg-
ment is obviated. It is doubtful, however, whether the same rule would be
applied where a senior mortgagee purchased for less than the amount of his
lien.43  That it should, seems clear, for, by the omission of the junior
incmbrancer, the senior mortgagee should not be entitled to enhance his
rights. Although the rationale of partial subrogation could not be employed,
the result could be justified by rationalizing that, as against the junior
incumbrancer, the senior lien survived only to the amount credited upon the
debt. It would tend to raise the sale price to the amount of the prior lien
and thereby serve the policy of the law which abhors sacrifices and
forfeitures at judicial sales.
Where the purchase price is more than the senior incumbrance, the
amount necessary for redemption should be limited to the amount of the
prior lien. Thus, where the senior mortgagee purchases for more than the
amount of his lien, only the latter amount should be required for redemp-
41. Collins v. Riggs, 14 Wall. 491 (U. S. 1871). Here it was stated that, where
the property sold for less than the debt, the junior lienor could redeem only by paying
the full amount of the debt; that such amount would be distributed between the pur-
chaser and the senior mortgagee according to their interests. In so holding, the court
reasoned that, since the junior lienor retained his right by reason of the fact that the
prior lien had never been extinguished, he must proceed with consistency and pay it
off. Didn't the court forget that the senior lien is kept alive, not to protect the junior
lienor's interest, but to prevent him from acquiring a first lien on the property? Cf.
Ketcham v. Deutsch, 211 N. Y. 85, 89, io5 N. E. 85, 86 (194). But see Brainard v.
Cooper, io N. Y. 356, 359 (,852).
42. Karl v. Conner, 3o Ky. L. Rep. 238, 97 S. W. miii (i9o6); Stewart v.
Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 5o Ohio St. 151, 41 N. E. 247 (1895) ; see Childs v. Childs,
io Ohio St. 339, 346 (1859) ; 3 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FoREcLosURE (5th ed. 1939) § 1100.
43. In both Alabama and Kentucky it would seem that the rule of pro tanto sub-
rogation might be applied where the property was purchased by a stranger, while the
general rule would be retained where the purchaser is the foreclosing party. Karl v.
Connor, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 238, 97 S. W. II (i9o6); see Wiley, Banks & Co. v. Ewing,
47 Ala. 418, 426 (1872). If there is, in fact, such a distinction, no explanation is at-
tempted.
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tion. Where a third person purchases, paying more than the senior lien,
he should be subrogated to the full extent of the prior incumbrance, but
the excess should be lost. This does work a considerable hardship upon
the purchaser and operates to deprive him of a part of his investment. How-
ever, in view of the fact that he is held to constructive notice through recor-
dation of the junior incumbrance, it seems preferable to the alternative of
a radical revision of the rights of the junior lienor by a proceeding in which
the latter was not allowed to participate.
Redemption under Statute or by Bill in Equity. The emergence of the
statutory right of redemption has further complicated the problem of pro-
tecting an omitted junior incumbrancer. Even though it has provided a
new remedy, it is not entirely clear as to the function this remedy serves
in the case of an omitted lienor.
It is generally said that, although there are two rights of redemption,
they do not exist at the same time.44 The equitable right arises upon the
maturity of the senior mortgage and continues until it is cut off by fore-
closure. On the other hand, the statutory right is said to come into existence
upon foreclosure, last for the statutory period, and then suddenly expire.45
In a normal situation this distinction is applicable, but where a junior lienor
has been omitted, there is reason for saying that both rights exist simultane-
ously. The equitable right has not been extinguished because there never
has been a valid foreclosure of the junior incumbrance. Nevertheless, as
to the mortgagor, there has been a valid foreclosure and therefore a statu-
tory right exists. At this point some question could be raised as to the
necessity of holding that, since the statutory right was in the mortgagor, it
should also be available to the omitted lienor whose equitable right still
exists. However, the redemption statutes have removed considerable doubt
by allowing redemption by subsequent incumbrancers where the mortgagor
has failed to exercise his right.46 Unless it were to be held that the statutes
applied only to those subsequent lienors whose liens were cut off by fore-
closure,47 it would seem that the omitted lienor also possesses the statutory
right. The cases do not seem to raise any question as to the existence of
the right, but turn more on the problem of whether, since such a right is
available, the equitable right has been destroyed.
Although there is some dissent,48 it is the general rule that an omitted
incumbrancer possesses both of the redemption rights.49 It is important,
therefore, to determine in each case just what relief is sought, for the con-
sequences can be utterly different. Where the omitted lienor brings a bill
to redeem he is entitled only to an assignment of the security of the prior
44. 3 WILrslE, MORTGAGE FoRECLoSURE (5th ed. 1939) § io6o.
45. Eiceman v. Finch, 79 Ind. 5II (88).
46. ARIz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4227; IND. STAT. ANN. (Bald-
win, 1934) §§ 627, 630; I ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) 3-502 (2) ; Cf. 2 ARK. DIG. STAT.
(Pope, 1937) §§ 9464, 9473.
47. Nelson v. First Nat. Bank of Jewell, 199 Iowa 804, 202 N. W. 847 (1925) (by
questionable implication). Yet if statutory redemption is allowed to those who acquire
their judgments after foreclosure, Hruby v. Steinman, 24 N. E. (2d) 175 (Ill. App.
1939), there would seem to be little reason for denying it to those lienors who were
not cut off by the foreclosure.
48. Hummel v. Citizens B. & L. Ass'n, 38 Ariz. 54, 296 Pac. 1014 (1931) (omitted
lienor possesses statutory right of redemption and a power to foreclose) ; American
Buttonhole Co. v. Burlington Mutual Loan Ass'n, 61 Iowa 464, 16 N. W. 527 (1883)
(statutory period of redemption only applies to actions at law) ; cf. Gower v. Win-
chester, 33 Iowa 303 (1872).
49. Whitney v. Higgins, IO Cal. 547 (1858) ; Parcells v. Nelson, 103 Mont. 412, 63
P. (2d) 131 (1936); 3 WILT1E MORTGAGE FoREcLosURE (sth ed. 1939) § 1185; cf.
Bunce v. West, 62 Iowa 8o, 17 N. W. 179 (1883).
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lien and not to a conveyance of the property.50 Where he exercises his
statutory right, however, it is impossible to generalize the results which
follow his action, for they are largely dependent upon the particular statute.
In some states, where the mortgagor has been given a prior exclusive right
to redeem and has failed to exercise it, the redemptioner acquires title to
the property.5' The time within which redemption must be made likewise
depends upon the right which is employed, while the amount which must
be tendered differs in that the same measure is not used. In cases of
equitable redemption the omitted lienor tenders the amount of the prior
mortgage, while under the statute he is required to pay the amount paid
at the sale plus the liens of prior redemptioners. 52  Statutory redemption
may also have the effect of discharging the debt owed by the mortgagor, 5
while in the case of redemption by bill in equity, the debt remains.
Since the equitable right to redeem originated as a device by which
the chancellor could provide a remedy where none existed at law, it might
be argued that the statutory right should now be the only available remedy
because it does provide a remedy at law. It might be contended that the
statutory right should cause a suspension of the equitable right for the
duration of the statutory period upon the same basis, and the argument
could be supported by the fact that in the usual case it would be more
profitable to the omitted lienor to bring himself within the statutory require-
ments. However, in view of the fact that there is such a great variance in
result and because the remedies serve different purposes, it cannot be said
that the statutory right affords the same right which the omitted incum-
brancer had before foreclosure. Therefore it seems desirable to allow both
of them to exist concurrently.
Accountability of Purchaser for Rents and Profits. Where a consid-
erable time has elapsed between the sale and discovery of the omission, the
purchaser is apt to have received sizeable rents from the property in the
interim. Before foreclosure, when a mortgagee assumes possession, it is a
general rule that he must account for the reasonable value of the rents and
profits and apply them to the interest and principal of the mortgage debt.
54
Where a foreclosure has been defective by reason of the omission of a sub-
ordinate interest, a majority of the courts hold that the purchaser must
account in the same manner.5 5 The reasoning is that, as to the omitted
lienor, the purchaser is but a mortgagee in possession. 6 It is felt that it
would be inequitable to allow the purchaser to claim to be a mortgagee in
order to defeat the junior mortgagee's contention that he should hold a first
lien on the property and, at the same time, repudiate that claim as to the
5o. Caterlin v. Armstrong, 79 Ind. 514 (1881); Shelton v. O'Brien, 285 S. W. 260
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
51. 4 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson and McFarland, 1935) § 9444.
52. Machold v. Farnan, 2o Idaho 8o, 117 Pac. 408 (1911).
53. See Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform
Mortgage Act (1925) 23 MICH. L. REv. 825, 847 et seq.
54. See WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 320.
55. Hosford v. Johnson, 74 Ind. 479 (1881); Johnson v. Harmon, ig Iowa 56
(1865); Atwater v. West, 28 N. J. Eq. 361 (1877); Walsh v. Rutgers Fire Ins. Co.,
13 Abb. Pr. 33 (N. Y. 1861) ; Benedict v. Gilman and Couch, 4 Paige 58 (N. Y. 1833).
But see 3 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FoREcLOSuEi (5th ed. 1939) § 1237. Of course, where
the junior lienor brings himself within a redemption statute the accountability of the
purchaser will depend on the particular statute. See 3 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FoRECLo-
suRE (Sth ed. 1939) § 811.
56. Walsh v. Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 13 Abb. Pr. 33 (N. Y. 1861) ; see County of
Floyd v. Cheney, 57 Iowa I6o, 163 (i881).
necessity of accounting for rents and profits.-7  Some courts, however,
realizing that the prior claim is but a label to keep the purchaser from losing
his investment, allow such vacillation.58 Other decisions state that since a
mortgagee is no longer allowed to go into possession, a purchaser could not
do so. Therefore, they say, he must be in possession as the holder of the
equity of redemption and, as such, he cannot be required to account.5 9
It has been suggested that where the purchaser pays more than the
amount of the senior incumbrance he should be allowed the rents as com-
pensation for his expenditure, but that he should be required to account
where he has but bid the amount of the prior lien.60 This distinction seems
dubious.
Here again there are conflicting policies. On one hand it is desirable
that the purchaser should receive some return on the money which he, in
apparent good faith, invested in the property; it is also desirable, however,
that the mortgage debt be reduced as quickly as possible. As no single
policy appears predominant, perhaps it is best to leave the matter to the
discretion of the court.
Allowance for Improvements. Good faith on the part of the purchaser
appears to be the controlling factor in the determination of whether, upon
subsequent foreclosure or redemption, an allowance will be made for valu-
able improvements which have been placed on the land.61 Where the pur-
chaser has been ignorant of the claim of the junior lienor, the value of the
improvements will be added to the amount to which he is entitled. And
this will be done even though the improvements were not necessary for the
preservation of the property.62 Before foreclosure, where a mortgagee
assumes possession and erects improvements, it is usually held that he is
not entitled to an allowance for them. The rationale is that, even though
they add to the value of the property, nevertheless, if allowed, they would
hinder the ability of the mortgagor to redeem.68
It would seem that the equities are a bit stronger for the purchaser who
erects in good faith than they are for the mortgagee who assumes possession
prior to foreclosure. In any case, this too is a situation wherein the decision
may be left to the discretion of the court.
LIMITATIONS UPON THE REMEDIES OF THE OMITTED JUNIOR LIENOR
Though the foregoing discussion may have conveyed the impression
that an omitted subsequent incumbrancer has an absolute right to any par-
ticular remedy, that is not the case. As previously noted, a prerequisite to
57. See Compton v. Jessup, 68 Fed. 263, 3o8 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895).
58. Gasldll v. Viquesney, 122 Ind. 244, 23 N. E. 79I (i8go); Caterlin v. Arm-
strong, 79 Ind. 514 (1881) ; Parcells v. Nelson, io3 Mont. 412, 63 P. (2d) 131 (1936).
59. Higgenbottom v. Benson, 24 Neb. 461, 39 N. W. 418 (1888).
6o. See Compton v. Jessup, 68 Fed. 263, 308 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895).
61. Benedict v. Gilman and Couch, 4 Paige 58 (N. Y. 1833). A slightly different
aspect was presented in Higginbottom v. Benson, 24 Neb. 461, 39 N. W. 418 (0888),
wherein it is stated: "It would seem to be against equity for a junior lienor to remain
passive until valuable improvements were made, and then compel the purchaser to re-
deem from his mortgage, or, in case of his inability to do so, resell the property made
more valuable by the improvements, without any allowance therefore." Cf. Cram v.
Cotrill, 48 Neb. 646, 67 N. W. 452 (1896) (allowance denied for lack of good faith) ;
Catterlin v. Armstrong, 79 Ind. 514 (88) (purchaser held to constructive notice).
But see Haines v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. 459 (1818) (purchaser with knowledge allowed
for improvements).
62. Although no specific holding could be found to this effect, nevertheless its total
absence as an apparent operative factor suggests that it is of little weight. See WILT-
SIE, MORTGAGE FoREcLosuRE (5th ed. 1939) § 1235.
63. See WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §21.
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the effective assertion of a claim is that the purchaser have either actual or
constructive knowledge of the existence of the omitted lien.64 In addition,
since many of the rules overlap, the ultimate outcome of any particular
controversy is likely to depend upon the equities of the situation or upon an
individual court's view as to the dominant social policy. These limitations
cannot be segregated and broken down into definite rules any further than
to state that they are always an actuating factor. However, subject to these
incalculables, certain rules have developed which are capable of a more
precise definition.
(a) Re-foreclosure by the Purchaser
It seems well established that, after discovering the defect in his title, a
purchaser may bring a bill of foreclosure against the junior lienor and
thereby cut short the outstanding incumbrance. 65 There is ample justifica-
tion for such a practice because it does no more than provide for the omitted
lienor that which was denied to him at the previous foreclosure, i. e. a sale
at which he could appear and protect his interest. Although it forces his
hand and bars him from the privilege of exercising a remedy of his own
choosing, it does not take away any rights which he possessed before fore-
closure. Before the prior foreclosure he was subject to such a proceeding
upon maturity of the senior mortgage. Since the purchaser is accorded
the rights of the senior incumbrancer, there is no reason why a prior
omission should bar this legitimate right.
(b) Junior Incumbrance Discharged by Payment of the Debt
Ordinarily it would seem that, in addition to a right to terminate the
interest of the junior lienor by foreclosure, a purchaser should be possessed
of a right to redeem the junior mortgage.66 Where the subsequent lien is
fully paid its holder has little opportunity for complaint. The right is based
upon the portion of the equity of redemption which the purchaser acquired
at the prior defective foreclosure. Although it is not sufficient to enable
him to convey a clear title it should be enough to allow him to redeem.
Where, however, a statutory right of redemption exists, there is a
different problem. In that situation, under some statutes, a purchaser
merely has an alternative right to receive the amount tendered by a redemp-
tioner or a certificate of purchase where no redemption has been made.
7
While the statutory right is in the junior lienor, it would seem to be an
effective bar to redemption by the purchaser unless the junior lienor
acquiesces.""
(c) Strict Foreclosure of the Omitted Lien
"Strict foreclosure" in its modem sense, is a device whereby omitted
liens may be cut off by a purchaser who bought without notice of the
incumbrances.6 9 It has the effect of accelerating the time within which the
64. See note 23 supra.
65. Hibben, Hollweg & Co. v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., go Ind. App. 683,
169 N. E. 693 (193o); Mortgage Commission Realty Corp. v. Columbia Heights Ga-
rage Corp., 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 74o, 169 Misc. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; see Moulton v. Cor-
nish, 138 N. Y. 133, 145 (1893).
66. Jones v. Hartsock, 42 Iowa 147 (1875) ; Parcells v. Nelson, 103 Mont. 412, 63
P. (2d) 131 (1936); Murphy v. Farwell, 9 Wis. 1O2 (1859); see Huselby v. Allison,
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junior lienor must act in order to protect his rights and it limits the reme-
dies of the latter to redemption. It is a drastic measure and is therefore
very properly limited to exceptional cases.
7 0
Originally it was said that in order to obtain such a decree against an
unjoined junior incumbrancer, it was necessary for the purchaser to show
two things. He had to prove that he purchased without actual knowledge
of the outstanding incumbrance and in good faith, and also that the junior
lienor knew of the sale but permitted him to buy the property without dis-
closing the existence of his lien.71 With this restriction the device has a
valid place in the law. The junior lienor should not be entitled to capitalize
upon a non-joinder where, inasmuch as he knew of the sale, actually there
was no necessity for it. In later cases the courts withdrew from a close
adherence to the conditions precedent, and allowed a decree of strict fore-
closure whenever they felt that it was proper.72 Since, however, the decree
does force a decision upon the junior lienor and since it bars him from a
sale, it should be kept within its original bounds.
(d) Where Interest of Junior Incumbrancer is Nominal
There are many dicta to the effect that a given right is in the junior
lienor and that its exercise cannot be denied by the courts on the mere
ground that it would be unprofitable to the omitted lienor.7' However,
when they are faced with the necessity of deciding whether or not a re-sale
should be had, they may deny it where it does not appear to them that the
property is reasonably worth more than the amount of the prior lien.7 ' In
so deciding they adopt a practical approach and require that there be a
substantial interest which is to be protected and not a mere fictitious cause
of action. However, if the court takes as its measure of value, the price
which the property brought at the ,first sale, such an approach might be
dangerous. Where the senior mortgagee was the only bidder it is obvious
that the sale price will not reflect the actual value of the land; 7- in addition
it is well known that the value of land cannot be determined at auction sale.
To avoid possibilities of a false base, a court adopting such an approach,
should have appraisals made of the land in question. But when it is con-
sidered that such a procedure might involve considerable expense and need-
lessly increase costs, it would seem that a better rule would be to adhere to
the dicta and allow a sale regardless of the amount which it might bring to
the omitted incumbrancer.
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TIME WITHIN WHICH REMEDIES MUST BE EXERCISED
Where the junior lienor proceeds to redeem under a statute, the answer
is clear-he must redeem within the time expressly provided by the par-
ticular statute.7 6 But where he attempts to exercise rights which have been
saved as the result of omission, the cases become confused. All feel that
there should be some definite temporal limitation, but great is the diversity
as to the nature of the limitation and as to how it should be computed.
To a large degree the diversity depends upon the particular statutes
of limitation.7 7 In addition, however, there may be one time within which
redemption must be made and another for foreclosure.78 These periods are
subject to curtailment by many factors, among which laches plays an impor-
tant part. Although some decisions state that laches can have no operation
within the statutory period,7 9 it has been said that where the property was
subject to sudden and great fluctuations in value, laches could operate to
bar.Yo
The question of when the statute of limitations upon the junior lienor's
rights begins to run may also be of importance in occasional cases. The
courts' answers have not been clear, but they have taken the position that
the statute commences to run, at least, at the maturity of the junior mort-
gage,"' while not deciding definitely that it begins at the maturity of the
senior mortgage. Some of the confusion may be laid to the wording of the
statutes.8 2 However, in the absence of qualification imposed by statute, it
would seem that the limitation should begin to run at the maturity of the
senior mortgage,8 3 for that is the time when the junior lienor's right to
redeem accrues.
As has been noted, 4 the junior lienor's remedies may be extinguished
short of the statutory period by affirmative action on the part of the pur-
chaser. By bringing an action to foreclose, by redeeming, or by obtaining
a decree of strict foreclosure, he can force the issue. With the proper lim-
itations these qualifications upon the remedies of the junior lienor serve a
76. See CAMPBELL, CASES ON MORTGAGES (1939) 315 n. I for a collection of stat-
utes pertaining to statutory redemption. For judicial criticism of the effects of such
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valid purpose in that they provide for the clearing of questionable titles
without the necessity of waiting for action by an omitted lienor.
CONCLUSION
The law which has evolved for the protection of the omitted junior
incumbrancer is the result of the counter-play of numerous conflicting inter-
ests. It has involved a consideration of the positions of the senior mort-
gagee, the mortgagor, the innocent purchaser, the purchaser with knowl-
edge, and the omitted incumbrancer in various aspects. On occasion, one
interest, due to the social policy of a particular court, will appear in a
stronger light and so will be afforded complete protection, sometimes at
the expense of the others. More often, perhaps, a result has been due to a
blind adherence to a rule which was designed to meet one set of facts, but
which is completely inapplicable to the facts presented for decision.
It has been felt that it would be imposing too great a burden upon a
senior lienor to require him to locate all of the subordinate interests and
implead them in his cause. Such sentiment appears reasonable when it is
recalled that the senior mortgagee created his lien at a time when the pros-
pective junior incumbrancer was absent from the scene. Therefore, the
senior lienor is allowed to make a valid foreclosure without the presence
of the subsequent parties. But by so holding, the law introduces another
party who must be accorded some measure of protection.
It is obvious that after foreclosure a junior lienor's rights cannot be
exactly the same as they were before, if only for the reason that they must
be exercised against a different party or against the same party in a new
capacity. Conceding that they must be altered to some degree, it remains
to determine the extent to which they should be affected. Some courts have
attempted to set forth an all-inclusive rule which will cover every situation.
It is submitted, however, that this is not the proper course. There are too
many ways in which the problem can be presented; too many factors which
may appear or may be absent. In addition, the policy in favor of a particu-
lar party ebbs and flows with the prevailing thought of the community.
Although theories of title may provide a convenient peg on which to hang
an individual result, they tend to becloud the issue and to hamper the
rendition of an equitable decision in subsequent cases. A much more effec-
tive method is to recognize that there has been an alteration in circum-
stances which may or may not require an alteration in the rights available
to the omitted party. Proceeding from such a premise, the courts
should then endeavor to provide for the junior lienor a substitute for the
rights which have been taken from him.
By frankly recognizing that the rights afforded the junior incumbrancer
are but remedial in nature, and that they are not the identical rights which
he possessed before the foreclosure, courts can take into consideration equi-
ties which should and do affect a particular result. It is in this way only
that the law can be kept in the flexible state which is absolutely essential for
the maintenance of a proper balance between the respective interests.
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